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President’s
message
rom time to time, the question is raised:
“Does the Federal Reserve still need 12
regional banks?”
In a Wall Street Journal article earlier
this year, a former vice chair of the Federal
Reserve’s Board of Governors suggested the
answer to that question is “no,” saying it is
“very clear” 12 banks are no longer necessary
and that as few as four might be sufficient.
While some might occasionally suggest a
reduction in the number of banks is in order,
the Federal Reserve believes in its own future as
a 12-bank system. The Federal Reserve has
invested in new facilities in Minneapolis,
Atlanta and most recently Kansas City, where
we will be moving into our new headquarters
building in 2008.
However, with the changes occurring in the
banking industry, it is understandable why some
might raise the topic of the number of regional
Reserve Banks and efficiency. The banking and
economic structure of the United States obvious-
ly has changed in the decades since the Federal
Reserve was created. Today, while currency
remains in wide use, check writing is in decline,
and credit and debit card use is becoming the
standard payment means. These developments
most certainly have affected Federal Reserve
operations nationwide.
So, as a particular business changes, it is
perhaps anticipated that some would ask
whether a 12-Reserve Bank system is necessary.
It is, in this narrow context, a fair question. 
However, it is a question that fails to
appreciate the founding purpose and structure
of the Federal Reserve System. It is a question
that, by its very asking, reflects a different
understanding of value versus cost. 
The Federal Reserve’s
12-bank system was not
established as simply a
check-processing system.
It was designed to serve
multiple interests across a
variety of regions and
financial institutions. It
was designed to assure
broad input to decisions
and to provide a mecha-
nism to build national
policy consensus across
broad regional, econom-
ic and cultural differences. And it was designed
as a public-private partnership, accountable to,
and yet independent of, the government.  To
miss these connections is to incorrectly tie the
Federal Reserve’s structure to its processing
activities rather than to its efforts of assuring
trust in the institution.
The 12-bank system reflects the vast eco-
nomic differences among regions in the United
States. It also reflects the need to provide a mech-
anism for input to banking and our important
credit policy activity for each region.
Our nation’s regional differences are illus-
trated in a variety of forms.  For example, some
years ago, I spoke with a policy person from
another sector of the country making his first
visit to the Midwest. During the conversation
he quite sincerely noted how impressed he was
that the city had such a “full” skyline. Clearly
he was surprised. Similarly, an East Coast
reporter traveling to Cleveland once phoned
and asked us if he could drive by and see the
Kansas City Bank during the trip. He appar-
ently thought Kansas City and Cleveland were
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closer than the more than 800 miles that sepa-
rate us. Being from Missouri, I have come to
appreciate in a personal sense our regional dif-
ferences. In my travels through the southern
United States, I am often called a Yankee,
while, in the north, I might be referred to as a
Southerner. Most recently I took notice of a
New York Times article pointedly titled “The
Not-So United States.”
From an economic perspective, these
regional variances can be even more striking.
One need only look at the differences in aver-
age home prices between any Midwestern
community and a similar community on either
coast to get some idea of the diversity of our
economy. Regional employment and manufac-
turing can also vary greatly.
The fact is that as homogenous as we like
to think we are, we remain a country with
large variances in regional perceptions, biases
and economies.
The founders of the Federal Reserve were
clearly addressing these differences when they
created our decentralized system in 1913. Even
then, decades before today’s high-speed tech-
nology, there was no compelling physical rea-
son for having 12 Reserve Banks.
In fact, the nation previously had not one,
but two monolithic central banks, both locat-
ed in Philadelphia.
The first Central Bank of the United
States was established in 1791 and was
designed by Treasury Secretary Alexander
Hamilton. It was controversial from the start.
Some protested its constitutionality. Many
were fearful of its influence.
When it came time for Congress to
renew the Bank’s charter in 1811, the Bank’s
critics were able to stop it. The proposed
renewal lost by a margin of a single vote in
each house of Congress.
The issue of a central bank reappeared in
1816. For five years, the country had been with-
out a central bank to regulate banking and cred-
it. Meanwhile, the War of 1812 had thrown
American finance into chaos. The Second Bank
of the United States was chartered under
President James Madison, and once again there
was widespread public distrust.
In essence, neither the first nor second
central bank of the United States was widely
understood by the population at large. In each
case, the central bank was structured as a single
bank. It was central and I am sure, using
today’s jargon, it was efficient—but mostly it
was distrusted and even hated by some.
Andrew Jackson, a populist president, vetoed
the renewal of the Second Bank’s charter,
bringing an end to central banking in the
United States for the next eight decades.
Regional distrust and dissatisfaction crip-
pled the nation’s first two central banks and
contributed to their eventual demise.
Early in the 20th century, as the United
States became a growing economic force, it was
apparent the banking and financial system
needed a “central bank.” During this period,
the United States faced numerous instances of
financial panic as commercial banks across the
country suffered serious liquidity problems.
Business credit collapsed, and the public suf-
fered significant financial hardship.
But there were a few hurdles to overcome
in chartering this third central bank. Among
the most important was the question of
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have a highly centralized institution with con-
centrated authority. Or would it be best to cre-
ate a new system—a decentralized system that
would share authority across the nation?
In his memoirs, Paul Warburg, one of the
Federal Reserve’s founders, lists the main objec-
tions to the establishment of the central bank: 
First: The danger of political control,
Second: The danger of control by special
interests,
Third: Hurtful competition with existing
banks.
The debate regarding the structure of the
central bank went on for some time, but in the
end, “a system of centralized reserves and
decentralized banking power is clearly the sys-
tem that this country requires,” Warburg said. 
This time the founders better understood
that to provide for a more durable institution
they needed a structure that shared the institu-
tion’s responsibilities and power across the
country, not just with the central government
and in Wall Street. It was concluded our cen-
tral bank should reflect the value we Americans
place in shared control of some of our more
important institutions.
Each Reserve Bank has a board of directors
from the region where it is located. These direc-
tors not only provide oversight of the Reserve
Banks, but also information regarding their
industries and communities. As was noted to me
some time ago, “through these 12 Reserve
Banks, the Federal Reserve has roots that run
deep within our communities, which enables it
to garner broad public knowledge and support,
and to function far more effectively than if it was
located in only a few places.”  
The 12 regional banks flanking the Board
of Governors keep the Federal Reserve from
becoming insulated from Main Street America.
They interact with the public and finan-
cial institutions at a local level. In doing so, the
central bank demonstrates it is something
other than a cumbersome bureaucracy count-
ing its money. The board offers the public
unprecedented direct access to the thinking of
policymakers. Each bank is part of the basic
fabric of its community, providing a connec-
tion between the community and its business
and policy roles. This has been a critical ele-
ment of the Federal Reserve’s long-run success. 
This structure and these principles are as
important today as they were in 1913, perhaps
more so. The Federal Reserve System remains a
powerful institution. Its ability to gain and hold
a broad base of trust and support is fragile, yet
crucial to its success and, even more important-
ly, to the success of our national economy.  
In terms of its overall operations and poli-
cy, the 12-bank system has consistently shown
itself to be efficient and adaptable to change. 
During the recent decades, it is hard to
name another organization that has been sys-
tematically more effective in carrying forward
its missions, whether in providing services to
the public or conducting day-to-day policy. 
Just as important, the 12-bank system has
performed superbly across the nation during
numerous crisis situations, ranging from the
banking crisis of the 1980s, through the Y2K
millennium experience, the tragedy of 9/11,
and most recently during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.
Of course, it may be argued that the issue
isn’t so much about a centralized or decentral-
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should have fewer than 12 banks. That debate
also occurred at the Federal Reserve’s founding.
There was considerable, and often heated, dis-
cussion regarding the number of Federal
Reserve Banks. Some wanted as few as five
while others wanted more. 
Even after the System was established with
12 banks, the debate continued for a time. It is
interesting to recall that within about two years
of the formation of the Federal Reserve, there
was a serious confrontation among the mem-
bers of the Board of Governors about reducing
the number of Districts. In the end, the
Attorney General of the United States wrote an
opinion stating, in essence, that the Board did
not have the authority to unilaterally reduce
the number of operating Reserve Banks.
Senator Carter Glass, one of the lawmakers
who helped create the Federal Reserve, said
those wanting to reduce the number of Banks
were ignoring the will of the Senate.
A system of reserve banks was seen as an
essential element to building trust in so power-
ful an institution, one that would have enor-
mous influence over our economic lives.  
It was also Paul Warburg who suggested one
strength of the Reserve System lies in one of its
weaknesses: protection against the dangers of an
autocratic central administration. In this respect,
the Reserve System was preferred to a more cen-
tralized system. There is no doubt that such a
system, if enacted, might have been more effi-
cient, but it certainly would have offered easier
and more tempting targets for political attacks.
This political superiority of the Reserve System
was of immense importance, although it is, at
the same time, a weakness.  
Obviously, many things have changed
during the past eight decades.  We have experi-
enced exceptional changes in technology,
banking structure, banking products and a
greater national and international scope of
business and banking. But, the fundamentals
that drove the United States toward a 12-bank
system are as real today as they were then.  
Today, concern for centralized and con-
centrated financial power understandably
remains important in the minds of the
American public. The trends in consolidation
have only heightened concerns in this regard.  
At the same time, although there has been
significant consolidation within the financial
system, there remain thousands of regional and
community banks which continue to play an
important role across the nation. Banking
activities vary across the nation and are greatly
affected by their regional economies. 
For example, about 25 percent of New
England’s banks failed in the early 1990s after
local real estate values collapsed. In our own
Tenth District, anyone involved in business or
banking can recall vividly what happened in
this region after the collapse of values in agri-
culture, energy and real estate. While it would
be nonsense to suggest that these crises could
not have been addressed in a centralized bank-
ing system, it is fair to say they were well
addressed in a decentralized, although coordi-
nated, manner.  
Knowledgeable working relationships
with regional and community banks are critical
to understanding change and perhaps even dis-
covering these types of problems in a timely
fashion. The 12 Reserve Banks give us a broad
distribution of contacts and means of interac-
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for understanding and responding to local
banking markets. Such interaction might be
accomplished with fewer than 12 Reserve
Banks but, I would argue, not as effectively.
On the justification for having fewer
rather than more Reserve Banks as it relates to
cost, I would note a couple of points.
The System has been diligent in control-
ling its costs. Inflation-adjusted expenses for
the 12 banks, as reported in the System’s budg-
et documents, have increased on average about
1.5 percent a year since 1970, showing actual
declines in real terms in recent years.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve has consol-
idated some of its operations where the oppor-
tunity to improve efficiency was apparent.
Check processing is one such area. Others
include wire transfers, retail electronic pay-
ments and support activities. All these actions
have served to contain costs.
Yes, there is every reason to pursue cost
savings when it makes sense to do so. Certainly
repetitive processes often benefit from new
technology that simplifies operations. 
But there is another side to consolidation
where costs can rise and performance can
decline. When the consolidation withdraws
authority for local decision-making, it can
lead to cumbersome bureaucracies, slower
decision-making and loss of local incentive
and performance.  
All consolidations involve cost-benefit
trade-offs.  Balancing the difficult-to-measure
benefits of access, communication, broad region-
al representation and operational delivery against
any hard-dollar savings that might come from
having fewer banks requires an understanding of
bottom-line accounting and organizational
purpose. In this context, the value over the cost
of our 12-bank system is considerable.
Finally, the value of this structure has been
recognized by others. In 1998, the 16-bank
European Central Bank was established and
modeled closely to the Federal Reserve. Like
our nation’s central bank, the ECB is responsi-
ble to a diverse population across a broad
region with varying economic and banking
conditions. As with the Federal Reserve, a
broad base of support is necessary for the ECB
to succeed in its mission. 
Robert Bremner, in his biography of
Chairman William McChesney Martin,
referred to a quote which described the Federal
Reserve System as “America’s greatest contribu-
tion to the science of government.” 
While this may be hyperbole, looking in
the past, this structure has served us well. And
looking to the future, it is designed to last.
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